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"ENTREAT ME NOT TO LEAVE THEE":*
BOTTOMS V. BOTTOMS AND THE CUSTODY RIGHTS OF GAY
AND LESBIAN PARENTS

Stephen B. Pershing**

I. INTRODUCTION

When the history of gay and lesbian civil rights in the United States
comes to be written, a chapter will surely be devoted to the case of Sharon
Lynne Bottoms. In the summer of 1993, a remarkable year in the struggles
of homosexual Americans against discrimination,' this young Virginia
mother, who never wanted to be famous-least of all for her love of
another woman-became a national and international celebrity almost
literally overnight. Millions of people now know her name and her
situation: she lost custody of her two-year-old child to her mother in court
solely because she wanted a family that did not fit the norm.2
"[Eintreat me not to leave thee, or to return from following after thee: for whither
thou goest, I will go; and where thou lodgest, I will lodge: thy people shall be my people,
and thy God, my God: Where thou diest, will I die, and there will I be buried.
Ruth 1:16-17 (King James) (Ruth to Naomi).
Legal Director, American Civil Liberties Union of Virginia. A.B., Harvard
University, 1979; J.D., University of Virginia, 1987. The author is one of Sharon
Bottoms' attorneys. For assistance with this Article and with the shaping of his
understanding, the author wishes to thank Abby Abinanti, Sharon Bottoms, Linda Burton,
Donald Butler, Sarita Brown, Susan Canby, Richard D'Alessio, Scott Drabenstadt, Marc
Elovitz, Kimberly Filbert, Emily Finkelstein, Rochelle Klinger, Player Michelsen, Daniel
Ortiz, Charlotte Patterson, Nancy Polikoff, Gary Spitko, Miriam Solomon, Peter Swisher,
and April Wade.
' See, e.g., Andrew Kopkind, The Gay Moment, 256 THE NATION 577, 577 (May 3,
1993) (marking April 1993 gay rights march on Washington) ("Not for thirty years has
a class of Americans endured the peculiar pain and exhilaration of having their civil rights
and moral worth-their very humanness-debated at every level of public life.").
2 The dispute is between Sharon Bottoms and her natural mother, Kay Bottoms, over
custody of Sharon's natural son, Tyler Doustou, born July 5, 1991. Kay first petitioned
for custody in the local juvenile court, and at a hearing on March 31, 1993, that court
ruled:
Upon hearing the evidence ore tenus, custody of the above captioned child is hereby
awarded to Kay Bottoms, with visitation rights granted to the Mother as follows:
Reasonable, but not in the presence of her lesbian lover to which relationship the
child is not to. be exposed. The court finds Doe v. Doe, [284 S.E.2d 799 (Va.
1981),] cited by counsel[,] to be inapplicable, but relies on Roe v. Roe, [324 S.E.2d
691 (Va. 1985)].
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Sharon Bottoms and her son are now the best known victims, though
by no means the only ones, of the Virginia Supreme Court's 1985
pronouncement in Roe v. Roe 3 that lesbians and gay men are unfit, as a
matter of law, to have custody of their own natural children. The Bottoms

case, now on appeal to Virginia's intermediate appellate court,4 tests the
validity of the Roe presumption 5 in a factual, legal, and social science
research context different from what faced the court in Roe,6 but similar
enough to Roe as a matter of principle to bring that decision under
In re Doustou, No. J-32,113-01 (Va. Juv. & Dom. Rel. Ct. Henrico Co. Mar. 31, 1993).
Sharon appealed de novo to the Circuit Court, Bottoms v. Bottoms, No. CH93JA0517-00
(Va. Cir. Ct. Henrico Co. Sept. 7, 1993), and sought the assistance of the ACLU
Foundation of Virginia, which agreed to sponsor the litigation. Trial in the circuit court
proceeding took place before the Honorable Buford Parsons, Jr. on September 7, 1993,
and the ruling against Sharon was issued from the bench at the close of trial. Joint
Appendix at 197-99, Bottoms v. Bottoms, No. 1930-93 (Va. Ct. App. filed Sept. 28,
1993); Trial Transcript at 195-97, Bottoms v. Bottoms (No. CH93JA0517-00).
The court-appointed guardian ad litem for the child contended at trial that Sharon
showed "immatur[ity]" by failing to sever her lesbian relationship in order to please a
court that he thought would apply Roe against her claim for custody of her son. Joint
Appendix at 40-41, 191; Trial Transcript at 38-39, 189.
3 324 S.E.2d 691 (Va. 1985). Roe was premised on the "unlawful" nature of the
father's same-sex relationship, which the court called "immoral and illicit," and
described as an
intolerable burden upon [the child] by reason of the social condemnation attached
to [the father's relationship], which will inevitably afflict her relationships with her
peers and with the community at large .... The impact of such behavior upon the
child, and upon any of her peers who may visit the home, is inevitable.
Id. at 694.
The trial court in Bottoms ruled from the bench that Roe rendered Sharon an unfit
custodian as a matter of law and required a transfer of custody from her to Kay, the third
party. Joint Appendix at 197-99; Trial Transcript at 195-97.
' The Virginia Court of Appeals was created by statute in 1985, and was vested with
jurisdiction to hear appeals of right in domestic relations cases, among others. See VA.
CODE ANN. § 17-116.01 (Michie Supp. 1993).
Oral arguments in Bottoms were held before a panel of the Court of Appeals on
February 16, 1994, under a grant of expedited appeal. A decision is still awaited as this
Article goes to press.
' A conclusive presumption or per se rule it is indeed, for if read literally, it allows for
no exceptions, permits no kind or degree of evidence to overcome it, and most
importantly, applies even in the face of countervailing presumptions and shifts in burdens
of proof. See infra notes 85-87 and accompanying text; see Roe, 324 S.E.2d at 694 ("The
father's continuous exposure of the child to his immoral and illicit relationship renders
him an unfit and improper custodian as a matter of law.") (emphasis added).
6 Roe was a custody dispute between two natural parents, one homosexual and
the
other heterosexual, Roe, 324 S.E.2d at 692, while Bottoms is a dispute between a
homosexual natural parent and a heterosexual nonparent. See infra notes 113-20 and
accompanying text.
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fire-and in the process to raise the attention and the consciousness of
Virginia and the nation.
This Article proceeds from the premise that Sharon Bottoms' choice
of family life is legitimate and worthy of legal protection. The Article
discusses the Bottoms case in the context of other relevant decisions from
Virginia and around the United States. It examines the legal presumptions
and the social values that underlie, and escalate, controversies of this type,
and in the process touches on some of the social science and constitutional
arguments against classifications that burden parenting or other private
activities based on sexual orientation. The Article argues strenuously
against the reasoning and result of Roe, and in favor of universal adoption
of the rule of the more soundly decided cases-that a parent's sexual orientation alone should not determine his or her suitability as custodian of a
child.7
II. DEBUNKING THE MYTHS: FLAWS IN SOME COMMON RATIONALES
FOR ANTI-GAY CUSTODY DETERMINATIONS

The care and custody of children is an indisputably central function of
family units that include children. Predictably, child custody is politicized
whenever family relations become politicized. As current events in this
country make clear, nothing is more politically controversial at the moment
than homosexuality and related matters of lifestyle and family. The country
collectively is divided on whether there is or should be such a thing as gay
and lesbian families, let alone gay and lesbian civil rights inside or outside
those families. 8
In child custody cases involving lesbians and gay men in American
courts, the question of the validity of homosexual love and partnership, or
its distinction from other forms of love or partnership, has typically been
presented in terms that serve anti-gay attitudes uniquely well: the
"fitness," expressed as a function of sexual orientation, of parents who
are gay or lesbian. 9 That such a criterion should even be suggested in child
custody disputes is itself undeniable evidence of the prevalence of
See infra notes 58-:67, 88 and accompanying text.

8 See, e.g., Peter Bacque, Sacred or Sacrilege? Same-sex Parents Struggle to Lead

OrdinaryLives, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Dec. 3, 1993, at El; Steven A. Holmes, Gay
Rights Advocates Bracefor Ballot Fights, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 1994, at A17 (discussing
recent ballot initiatives to bar localities from enacting laws that protect homosexuals from
discrimination); Gregory Vistica, In service or out,few salute policy, SAN DIEGO UNIONTRIB., July 20, 1993, at Al (noting criticisms of President Clinton's policy on gays in the
military by both proponents and opponents of gay rights).
9 For a discussion of the distinction properly to be drawn between fitness and
preferability of a custodian, see infra note 102 and accompanying text.
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aversions to gay and lesbian persons and lifestyles, known in the aggregate
as homophobia or heterosexism, °. in our society today.
The use of such a criterion for "fitness" of gay or lesbian custodians
is variously "justified" by citing one or more of several supposed ills
that states assert an interest in combatting: (1) the supposed illegality of
the parent's conduct; (2) the "immorality" of the parent's lifestyle,
regardless of legal prohibitions or proof of unlawful conduct; and (3) the
real or imagined effect on the child of exposure to the parent's gay or
lesbian relationship, or of community prejudice or opprobrium directed
toward the parent. None of these rationales is self-sustaining, but each
subsists on an underlying bias against homosexuality in and of itself. As
the discussion below suggests, this "false bottom" problem carries
serious constitutional implications.
A. The Illegality Rationale
The supposed "illegality" of homosexual relations" refers most
typically to statutes that criminalize sodomy, an act defined in Virginia and

to

An excellent discussion of judicial homophobia and heterosexism in this precise

context can be found in Professor Polikoff's pathbreaking article on lesbian parenting
issues. Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood
to Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional Families,
78 GEO. L.J. 459, 547-49 (1990) (citing G. Dorsey Green, Lesbian Mothers: Mental
Health Considerations, in GAY AND LESBIAN PARENTS 188 (Frederick W. Bozett ed.,
1987)).
Homophobia is what it sounds like: homo, [a] prefix meaning homosexual[,] and
phobia, meaning "an exaggerated, usually inexplicable and illogical fear of a
particular object or class of objects" .... Heterosexism... refers to our collective
assumption that all people are heterosexual, unless blatantly not so. It also pertains
to our bias that people should be heterosexual.
Green, supra, at 188; see also Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of
Gender, 1988 WIs. L. REV. 187. Professor Law amplifies the discussion as follows:
The pervasive cultural presumption and prescription of heterosexual relationships-and the corresponding silencing and condemnation of homosexual erotic,
familial and communitarian relations--can aptly be termed "heterosexism." In
popular culture, opposition to homosexuality is often characterized as "homophobia." That term suggests a fear of homosexuals and an individual pathological
hatred of them .... [H]eterosexism is a much broader phenomenon .... [It] shapes
the lives, choices, beliefs and attitudes of millions of people who experience neither
fear nor hatred of gay and lesbian people.
Id. at 195.
11 A distinction should be made here, but sadly is not often made
by courts, between
personal relationships and sexual activity. While relationships between persons may
consist of emotional, communicative, or physical bonds or connections of varying
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elsewhere as oral or anal sexual penetration regardless of the gender of the
partners.12 Custody dispositions based on the "illegality" of same-sex
relationships 3 appear to be concerned either with the lack of "legal
recognition" of the relationship,1 4 or else with certain sexual practices in
which homosexuals, in particular, are assumed to engage, regardless of the
extent to which heterosexuals also engage in them.' 5 This basis for
degrees of intimacy, cf Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619-20 (1984)
(intimate associational ties "involve deep attachments and commitments ... shar[ing] not
only a special community of thoughts, experiences, and beliefs but also distinctively personal aspects of one's life"), sexual activity by definition is found only in sexually
intimate relationships. However, no personal relationship, regardless of the living arrangements that attend it and the sexual orientation of the parties, necessarilyentails certain intimate sexual acts or should be presumed to do so. See infra note 24 and accompanying text.
"2 VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-361 (Michie Supp. 1993) (describing "crimes against
nature"). As of the decision in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), sodomy
prohibitions were in force in 23 states and the District of Columbia. See id. at 198 n.1
(Powell, J., concurring) (collecting statutes).
13 Massachusetts, Michigan, and South Carolina all have sodomy prohibitions, see
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 34 (West 1990); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.158 (West
1991); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-120 (Law Co-op. 1985), but do not use them to justify
a transfer of custody away from a gay or lesbian parent, preferring instead a "nexus"
test requiring a factual showing of harm to the child from the parent's homosexual
conduct. See Bezio v. Patenaude, 410 N.E.2d 1207, 1215 (Mass. 1980); Hall v. Hall, 291
N.W.2d 143, 144 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980); Stroman v. Williams, 353 S.E.2d 704, 705 (S.C.
1987).
"4 See, e.g., Jacobson v. Jacobson, 314 N.W.2d 78 (N.D. 1981) (finding that lack of
legal recognition of same-sex partnership rendered homosexual parent unsuitable).
15 See Hardwick, 478 U.S at 188 n.2, 190 (upholding Georgia's gender-neutral sodomy
statute against federal due process challenge).
[T]he plaintiffs [in Hardwick] challenged the regulation of consensual sodomy .
. . It was the [Supreme] Court that understood the case as presenting an issue of
regulation of homosexual conduct rather than of sodomy in general. The Court
upheld the statute only insofar as it applied to consensual homosexual sodomy. The
Court reserved the question whether the statute would be valid if applied to
heterosexual sodomy.
Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientationand the Constitution: A Note on the Relationship
Between Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1161, 1169 (1988)
(footnotes omitted).
Four Justices dissenting in Hardwick criticized the majority for failing to address the
constitutionality of the statute as a whole, i.e., as applied to heterosexual and homosexual
acts alike. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 200 (Blackmun, J., joined by Brennan, Marshall, and
Stevens, JJ., dissenting).
Importantly, Hardwick did not decide whether classifications based on sexual
orientation violated equal protection. See infra notes 72-76 and accompanying text. Recent
social science research evidence clearly establishes that intimate sexual practices do not
markedly differ depending on the gender or the sexual orientation of the partners. See
infra note 21 and accompanying text.
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decision is immediately problematic for due process and equal protection
reasons, and may have first amendment infirmities as well.
First and most immediately, in the typical child custody case in which
a gay or lesbian parent is a party, no criminal charge of sodomy or other
illicit sexual conduct is asserted or proved. Judges who use the "illegality" rationale to disfavor a homosexual for child custody therefore
assume a violation of such a law, and necessarily do so in the absence of
indictment or conviction on the charge, or, in most cases, any direct evidence of sexual acts as part of the proofs. This ipso facto pretense seems
infirm at the threshold to the extent that it incorporates, in a civil case, a
judgment of criminal liability rendered without charge, without proof of
the violation sufficient to meet an appropriate burden, and without criminal
conviction and its attendant rights of direct and collateral review16
Second, although state statutes often criminalize certain sexual acts,
and occasionally levy their sanctions based on the gender of the persons
taking part,17 they do not, of course, forbid persons of either gender from
sharing living space, experiencing feelings of love, embracing one another
or otherwise displaying affection in public or private places, or-most
importantly-announcing, to intimate associates or to the world, a nonheterosexual orientation.18 Any such proscriptions, where they exist, are
sustained purely by cultural taboo. For the "illegality" of same-sex
16 In

the criminal context, the right to trial before conviction or punishment is
fundamental. U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial . . . ."). See, e.g., Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S.
103, 126 (1975) (pretrial detention without prompt judicial determination of probable
cause to believe detainee guilty violates Fourth Amendment). Even a civil proceeding to
compel forfeiture of property allegedly used in crime or acquired with its proceeds, see,
e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (1988), requires the Government to prove, at least by a
preponderance of credible evidence, probable cause to believe the subject property is
forfeit. United States v. $228,536.00, 895 F.2d 908 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 495 U.S.
958 (1991). While no court appears explicitly to have held that civil due process
guarantees forbidding removal of a child from a parent's custody based on assumed
parental guilt of a crime, several Virginia decisions have rejected custody challenges that
were based on a parent's felony convictions, not just uncharged suppositions of felonious
behavior. See infra notes 134-40 and accompanying text; cf, e.g., People v. Brown, 212
N.W.2d 55, 59 (Mich. Ct. App. 1973) (rejecting state-instituted civil custody challenge
against lesbian household under statute requiring change of custody on evidence of
"criminality" in part because one mother was denied statutory right to appointed
counsel).
17

See, e.g.,

ARK. CODE ANN.

§ 5-14-122 (Michie 1993);

KAN. STAT. ANN.

§ 21-3505

(1988); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-505 (1993); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-510 (1991).
I" See, e.g., High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 668 F. Supp.
1361, 1370 (N.D. Cal. 1987) ("[Bowers v.] Hardwick does not hold, for example, that
two gay people have no right to touch each other in a way that expresses their affection
and love for each other."), rev 'd, 895 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1990).

19941

CUSTODY RIGHTS

relationships, then, the threshold question is whether gay and lesbian
partnerships necessarily entail, to a greater extent than heterosexual ones,
intimate sexual acts that are against the law, and whether the acts
themselves are really any different when performed in gay rather than
straight relationships. 19 If, as common sense and social science research
suggest, the answer to these questions is no,2" then an "illegality"
distinction between rival custodians based on sexual orientation manifestly
lacks a factual basis.
Studies show that more than ninety percent of heterosexual couples,
married and unmarried, engage in oral sex in their own boudoirs. 2, Thus,
if a court deprives a lesbian or gay natural parent of custody of her or his
child based on an assumed violation of a gender-neutral sodomy or other
sexual conduct proscription, social science fact requires a similar finding
of unsuitability as to any rival for custody, regardless of that person's
gender or sexual orientation, who does not first certify abstinence from the
sexual activity in question. Needless to say, courts do not require
heterosexual custody claimants to make such a showing. This obvious
disparity, inexplicable except for anti-gay bias, is an important clue to the
irrationality, and therefore the defectiveness under the equal protection
clause, of disparate treatment of heterosexual and homosexual parents in
custody disputes.22

'9 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (1984) (at issue in Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 186);
ANN. § 18.2-361 (Michie 1988 & Supp. 1990), invoked in Roe v. Roe, 324
S.E.2d 691 (Va. 1985) (both gender-neutral).
20 See infra notes 21, 24 and accompanying text.
21 See, e.g., PHILLIP BLUMSTEIN & PEPPER SCHWARTZ, AMERICAN COUPLES 236 (1983)
VA. CODE

(finding that 90% of heterosexual couples in the United States have engaged in fellatio
and 93% in cunnilingus, and that same-sex couples engaged in oral sex only slightly more
frequently than opposite-sex couples).
22 Distinctions or classifications that are irrational, have no basis in fact, or are rooted
only in bias and prejudice against certain persons or classes of persons, fail even the
deferential "rational basis" test that federal equal protection doctrine uses to examine
state-created classifications that are not based on race, gender, national origin, and the
like. One important modem statement of the doctrine that bias-based classifications are
irrational is City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985)
(invalidating as irrational a local classification excluding homes for the mentally retarded
from certain neighborhoods). Cleburne is sometimes cited as an example of "rational
basis with bite," Gayle Lynn Pettinga, Note, Rational Basis With Bite. Intermediate
Scrutiny by Any Other Name, 62 IND. L.J. 779, 779 n.9 (1986), or "rational basis with
teeth," David 0. Stewart, A growing equal protection clause?, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1985, at
108, 112 (quoting Professor Victor Rosenblum of Northwestern University Law School).
Several arguments may also be made for heightened scrutiny of anti-gay parenting
presumptions under equal protection. See infra notes 72-76 and accompanying text.
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It would be a mistake to assume that all, and only, gay and lesbian
persons engage in prohibited forms of sexual intimacy.23 By the same
token, not all loving relationships, again regardless of sexual orientation,
necessarily entail sexual conduct that is against the law.24 Furthermore, as
a practical matter, the enforcement of statutes that prohibit particular
private consensual sexual activity is well-known to be virtually
impossible. 25 The Virginia sodomy statute, for example, apparently has
not been enforced against consenting adults since long before Roe v. Roe
was decided.26 Not surprisingly, there are no reported domestic relations
decisions in which a heterosexual parent has been denied custody or any
other parental right based on a sodomy or similar statute. No presumption
exists, in the law of Virginia or any other state, that heterosexuals are
unfit custodians of children based on the likelihood that they will violate
such a statute. Indeed, illegal sexual conduct of any kind is simply not
cited as support for a finding of unfitness of a heterosexual parent seeking
child custody. Courts seem disinclined to consider, for instance, proven
or unproven allegations of fornication 27 or lewd and lascivious cohabita23 See
24

supra note 21 and accompanying text; infra note 24 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., BLUMSTEIN & SCHWARTZ, supra note 21, at 236, 549 n.l2, 578 n.45

(finding that 23% of lesbians rarely or never engage in oral sex and that mutual
masturbation is the most common practice among gay male couples); ALAN P. BELL &
MARTIN S. WEINBERG, HOMOSEXUALITY 109 (1978) (finding manual stimulation to be the
sexual technique most commonly employed in female-female lovemaking). As a general
matter, it should be obvious that persons who profess a homosexual orientation do not
necessarily act on that preference by engaging in intimate sexual relationships or activities
at all, any more than do persons claiming a heterosexual orientation.
25 Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 196-97 (Powell, J., concurring) (citing non-enforcement of
the statute as reason that the arguably disproportionate length of sentences for sodomy
violations under the Eighth Amendment was not before the Court).
If sodomy laws did not exist or were not enforced against same-sex relationships any
more than opposite-sex ones, gay relationships would still be subject, like other
relationships, to the prohibitions on cohabitation or fornication-but these proscriptions are
unenforced and unenforceable even if they remain on the books. See Doe v. Duling, 603
F. Supp. 960 (E.D. Va. 1985) (holding Virginia cohabitation statute unconstitutional),
rev 'd, 782 F.2d 1202 (4th Cir. 1986) (plaintiffs lacked standing to sue because statute was
not being enforced).
26 VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-361 (Michie Supp. 1993) (no such cases reported); cf. Roe
v. Roe, 324 S.E.2d 691, 694 (Va. 1981) (relying on parent's assumed violation of
"crimes against nature" statute to deny custody because statute "is prosecuted with
considerable frequency and vigor, as evidenced by the decided cases annotated under [that
section] in the Code"). A review of the annotations to § 18.2-361 discloses no
convictions upheld against consenting adults since at least 1923, although several reported
cases involved prosecutions for forcible sodomy or sodomy committed against children.
27 See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-344 (Michie 1988) (making sexual intercourse
between two persons who are not married to each other a Class 4 misdemeanor).
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tion.28 Even in Virginia, recent child custody decisions have overlooked
or discounted the significance of violations of sexual conduct proscriptions by heterosexuals.29
From these facts the conclusion is inescapable that the true "illegality" criterion for anti-gay custody decisions, even in states with genderneutral sexual conduct prohibitions, is not conduct, but simply the announced homosexual orientation-the status-of one party. This distinction,
based solely on a status which is not itself illegal, and employed in a
manner at least quasi-punitive in its impact on the unsuccessful suitor for
custody, poses the well-known due process problem of Robinson v.
3°
California.

Fornication has been decriminalized in 37 states, and in several more states is still a crime
only when performed in public, with a minor, or with one who is married to someone
else. See Polikoff, supra note 10, at 552 n.522 (citing Law, supra note 10, at 189 n.10).
In Fort v. Fort, 425 N.E.2d 754 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981), the court upheld an award of
custody to a father despite evidence that he cohabited with another woman before and
after the divorce was final, in what the court called a violation of state laws against
fornication, cohabitation, and adultery. Id. at 756-59.
28 See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-345 (Michie 1988) (making it a Class 3
misdemeanor for unmarried persons to cohabit "lewdly and lasciviously," or for married
and unmarried persons alike to commit "open and gross lewdness and lasciviousness").
In at least one Virginia child custody case, Moore v. Moore, 183 S.E.2d 172 (Va. 1971),
a parent-parent dispute where both parents were concededly fit, the court declined to
transfer custody away from a mother who had left her husband and had begun cohabiting
with another man, a cleric. Id. at 174-75.
If logic had ruled the trial court in Bottoms, the illegality rationale for depriving Sharon
of custody should first have compelled a finding that the admitted cohabitation of
Sharon's mother Kay with her boyfriend for almost two decades rendered her an unfit
custodian.
29 Ford v. Ford, 419 S.E.2d 415 (Va. Ct. App. 1992); Sutherland v. Sutherland, 414
S.E.2d 617 (Va. Ct. App. 1992). In both cases, parents argued that their former spouses
had committed adultery in violation of Virginia Code § 18.2-365, and were therefore
presumptively unfit custodians. See Brown v. Brown, 237 S.E.2d 89 (Va. 1977) (affirming
grant of custody to father where mother lived in adulterous relationship). Both Ford and
Sutherland squarely rejected arguments, claimed to derive from Brown, that a parent's
private illicit sexual conduct iequired a finding of unfitness. Ford, 419 S.E.2d at 417
("Brown did not establish a per se rule prohibiting awarding custody to a parent involved
in an adulterous relationship .... ") (emphasis added); Sutherland, 414 S.E.2d at 618
("[Brown] did not establish a per se rule .... ").
Cohabitation prohibitions, like those against adultery, are no longer independently
enforced. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
30 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (invalidating a statute criminalizing the status of addiction to
narcotics). For a brief but provocative discussion of the Robinson problem in this context,
see Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 203 n.2 (1986) (Blackmun, J., joined by Brennan,
Marshall, and Stevens, JJ., dissenting). See also Ruth Marcus & Helen Dewar, Pact on
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Finally, if a presumption against the gay or lesbian parent punishes his
or her status, as opposed to conduct, it also appears to be based purely on
protected expression, i.e., the announcement of homosexual as opposed to
heterosexual orientation, or the sharing of that information with other persons, and therefore appears to violate the First Amendment. 3' While a state
can criminalize certain sexual conduct without violating private expressive
rights, it cannot constitutionally require persons to profess that the prohibited conduct is immoral, or to refrain from speaking sympathetically
about it. An anti-gay custody presumption that is based purely on the
announced gay or lesbian status of one party, even where that party does
no intimate or unlawful act in or out of the child's presence, punishes
openly gay persons but not those who remain in the closet,312 and thus
accomplishes indirectly the censorship of private speech that the state
cannot impose directly. In particular, it would seem improbable for the
state to deny child custody to a parent who did no more than "come out"
privately to his or her child. Surely the state cannot permissibly seek to
dictate the beliefs of its citizens by requiring that parents teach their
children a certain View of human sexuality as a condition of entrustment
with their care.33

Gay Ban Remains Elusive, WASH. POST, Jan. 29, 1993, at. Al, All (quoting President
Clinton as saying, "People should be disqualified from serving in the military based on
something they do, not based on who they are .... ")
3' Nan D. Hunter, Identity, Speech, and Equality, 79 VA. L. REV. 1675, 1716-19
(1993); Note, Custody Denials to Parents in Same-Sex Relationships: An Equal Protection
Analysis, 102 HARV. L. REV. 617, 632-33 (1989) [hereinafter Custody Denials].
32 Courts also make this implied distinction when saying children are not harmed by
a "discreet" gay or lesbian relationship carried on by a parent. See infra notes 48-49 and
accompanying text.
33 See infra note 81 and accompanying text.
A ready analogy is to court decisions in Virginia and elsewhere that have refused to
require that a custodial parent indoctrinate a child into a particular religious belief or
tradition. See, e.g., Lundeen v. Struminger, 165 S.E.2d 285, 287 (Va. 1969) (declining, on
establishment of religion grounds, to enforce prior agreement of divorcing parents that child
would be raised in particular faith); Carrico v. Blevins, 402 S.E.2d 235, 237 (Va. Ct. App.
1991) (reversing, under state constitution's establishment clause, visitation order requiring
mother to take child to church or partly relinquish visitation to allow father to do so); see
also Stanton v. Stanton, 100 S.E.2d 289, 293 (Ga. 1957) ("[P]arents cannot by [prenuptial]
contract relating to the religious training of their children restrict the discretion of the court
in awarding custody, and the court may disregard entirely any such contract."); Hackett
v. Hackett, 150 N.E.2d 431, 434 (Ohio Ct. App. 1958) (separation agreement promising
that child be reared in a particular faith cannot be enforced by judicial decree); cf. Jones
v. Commonwealth, 38 S.E.2d 444, 448-49 (Va. 1946) (state religious freedom guarantee
was violated by probation order requiring children to attend church).
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B. The Immorality Rationale
Judicial reliance on a belief that homosexual relationships are "immoral" indicates, depending on one's viewpoint, either a devotion to
absolute moral principles or an ulterior subjective distaste for homosexuality in and of itself. The most troubling aspect of the use of "morality"
rationales standing alone is not that they appear in custody decisions in the
first instance, but that judges who rely on them find them so attractive
without meaningful independent support, particularly in the way of factual
showings of harm to the child.34
The "morality" of the various western sex taboos in general, and the
role of religion and other cultural forces as determinants of social norms
about those taboos, are of course beyond the scope of this Article. Suffice
it to say that the "morality" arguments found in American court
decisions on homosexual parenting seem derived chiefly from religious
traditions which are said to accept only those sexual relations that are

The language of a concurring opinion in Chicoine v. Chicoine, 479 N.W.2d 891
(S.D. 1992), is illustrative, even if almost hysterical in tone:
For years, [lesbian mother] has followed a life of perversion ....[She] has harmed
these children forever .... Until such time that she can establish, after years of
therapy and demonstrated conduct, that she is no longer a lesbian living a life of
abomination (see Leviticus 18:22), she should be totally estopped from
contaminating these children .... [A]n act against nature is an act against God..
•.There appears to be a transitory phenomenon [sic] on the American scene that
homosexuality is okay. Not so. The Bible decries it. Even the pagan "Egyptian
Book of the Dead" bespoke [sic] against it.
Id. at 896-97 (Henderson, J., concurring and dissenting in part) (footnotes omitted).
A number of decisions use other rationales for denying child custody as a mask for
imposing a "moral" view against homosexual relationships. See Thigpen v. Carpenter,
730 S.W.2d 510, 513 (Ark. Ct. App. 1987) (sleeping in same bedroom with same-sex
partner while children were at home held as failure to shield children from sexual activity
and presumed harmful to children in light of Arkansas precedent containing similar
presumptions with regard to other illicit sexual conduct); D.H. v. J.H., 418 N.E.2d 286,
296 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) (after lengthy discussion of mother's lesbianism as "relevant
and admissible" despite efforts to keep it out of evidence at trial, court affirmed award
of custody to father based on evidence of wife's "lack of proper housekeeping
standards," husband's "fix[ing] meals for the children because wife was out running
around," and husband's "assist[ing] children with lessons"); Chicoine, 479 N.W.2d at
893-94 (blurring distinction between mother's alleged mental illness and her lesbianism;
displaying preoccupation with specifics of lesbian sexual positions; equating "caressing,
kissing and saying 'I love you"' with more intimate behavior; and relying on "expert"
testimony that displays of non-intimate affection, regardless of the gender of the partners,
would encourage unspecified "sexual behavior" in the child).
14
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reproductive. 35 However, even in the face of these decisions, American
religious organizations themselves have adopted new positions that demonstrate the increasing enlightenment of contemporary religious views on the
issue.36 A notable example is the coalition amicus brief urging invalidation
See Polikoff, supra note 10, at 549-50. This is generally the position of the
"morality" cases even though it has never been the only view espoused within the
Western religious traditions in which most of our judges are reared. See, e.g., JOHN
BOSWELL, CHRISTIANITY, SOCIAL TOLERANCE AND HOMOSEXUALITY 61-206 (discussing
toleration of commonplace same-sex sexual behavior until the Middle Ages and citing
ambiguities in biblical references to homosexuality).
36 This evolutionary process appears to have begun at least as early as the 1970s. See,
e.g., Unitarian Universalist Association, General Assembly Resolution on Discrimination
against Homosexuals and Bisexuals (1970) ("Recognizing that ...[a] growing number
of authorities ... now see homosexuality as an inevitable sociological phenomenon and
not as a mental illness[,] ...[the Assembly] [u]rges all peoples immediately to bring an
end to all discrimination against homosexuals . . . ."); Office for Church in Society,
United Church of Christ, Policy on Human Sexuality and Ordination (1973)
("recommend[ing] homosexuality, per se, not be a bar to ordination, but that Associations
consider a candidate's total view of human sexuality and its moral expression"),
Pronouncement on Civil Liberties Without Discrimination Related to Affectional or Sexual
Preference (1975) ("declar[ing] support for federal, state and local legislation to
guarantee civil liberties for all persons, regardless of their affectional or sexual
preferences; call[ing] for church-wide action to secure such legislation"), Policy on
Virginia Privacy Laws (1991) ("reaffirm[ing] the right to privacy for all private,
consensual, non-commercial sexual activity between adults; call[ing] upon the Virginia
legislature to repeal the Virginia sodomy law and other legislation directed against persons
specifically because of their sexual orientation"); National Council of Churches of Christ,
Resolution on Civil Rights Without Discrimination as to Affectional or Sexual Preference
(1975) ("reiterat[ing] the Christian conviction that all persons are entitled to full civil
rights and equal protection and to the pastoral concern of the Church[;] ...urg[ing] its
member churches ...to work to ensure the enactment of legislation ...that would
guarantee the civil rights of all persons without regard to their affectional or sexual
preference"); Protestant Episcopal Church of the U.S.A., 65th General Convention,
Resolution on Human Sexuality (1976) ("Homosexual persons are children of God who
have a full and equal claim with all other persons upon the love, acceptance and pastoral
concern and care of the Church .... ."); American Jewish Congress, Convention
Resolution on Opposing Discrimination Against Homosexuals (1980) (opposing "all
discrimination against homosexuals-in employment, housing, military service, and other
areas"); American Jewish Committee Board of Governors, Statement Opposing
Discrimination Based Upon Sexual Orientation (1986) (declaring opposition to
"discrimination based upon sexual orientation in employment, housing, education and
public accommodations"); Convention of the Rabbinical Assembly, Resolution on Gay
and Lesbian Jews (1990) ("[We] [s]upport full civil equality for gays and lesbians in our
national life . . . ."); Federation of Reconstructionist Congregations and Havurot,
Homosexuality Commission Report, A Reconstructionist Approach to Homosexuality at
36 (1992) ("Many who reject Jewish law in other areas assert the binding nature of the
biblical condemnation of homosexuality. We bemoan justifying injustice by citing biblical
law ...Sexual orientation, like gender and other qualities that once served as rationales
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of the Georgia sodomy statute at issue in Bowers v. Hardwick." The
coalition stated its case this way:
To the extent there is any consensus concerning alternative
forms of sexual expression, heterosexual or homosexual, it
is that private sexual conduct is a matter fundamentally
committed to individual moral choice. Because we do not
understand the full mystery of human sexuality, and
because we are unwilling to condemn that which we do not
understand, we believe as a matter of ethics that characterizing consensual sodomy as immoral is unwise.38
Unfortunately however, the Supreme Court's decision in Hardwick
leads the charge in the opposite direction. The concurrence of Chief Justice
Burger in particular draws from supposed religious conventions in an
attempt to locate an absolute moral basis for the taboo against homosexual-

for discrimination, is a personality characteristic of all human beings. Homosexuality is
no different from heterosexuality in this respect. All people inherently deserve dignity,
integrity and equality ....We affirm the 1984 admission policy of the Reconstructionist
Rabbinical College, that 'age, sex, marital status, sexual orientation and race will not be
determining factors in the consideration of the Admissions Committee."'); United
Methodist Church, General Conference Book of Resolutions (1992) ("Certain basic
human rights and civil liberties are due all persons. We are committed to support those
rights and liberties for homosexual persons ....");American Baptist Church, U.S.A.,
Resolution Calling for Dialogue on Issues of Human Sexuality (1993) ("The time has
come for our churches ... and the General Board ...to consider prayerfully the mind
of Christ regarding human sexuality."); Evangelical Lutheran Church in America, Church
Council Resolution (1993) ("reaffirm[ing] that the historical position of the [Church] is
• . .support for legislation [and] policies to protect the civil rights of all persons,
regardless of their sexual orientation"); Union of American Hebrew Congregations,
General Assembly Resolution on Recognition for Lesbian and Gay Partnerships (1993)
("[T]he Union .. . resolves [to] call upon our... governments to adopt legislation that
will ...ensure that lesbians and gay men are not a[d]judged unfit to raise children
because of their sexual orientation[,] and afford partners in committed lesbian and gay
relationships the means of legally acknowledging such relationships ... .
" 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
3' Brief of Amici Curiae Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), Philadelphia Yearly Meeting
of Friends, American Friends Service Committee, Unitarian Universalist Association,
Office for Church in Society, United Church of Christ, and Right Rev. Paul Moore, Jr.,
at 4, Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (No. 85-140), quoted in Polikoff, supra
note 10, at 550.
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ity, 39 and in the process betrays a surprising indifference to the
provinciality of the supposed universals invoked.
The Hardwick morality analysis is really less an analysis than a
pastiche of ancient and continuing taboos and phobias that are said to add
up to "tradition," an influence whose power is essentially admitted to
derive from its own sheer longevity.40 In this respect, there are undeniable
parallels between Hardwick and any number of famous benign and not-sobenign judicial affirmations of now discredited private biases as to race
and gender, from Muller v. Oregon4 1 to Naim v. Naim4 2 and Plessy v. Ferguson.43
Alternatively, the supposed "moral"

justification for some courts'

aversion to same-sex love and partnership may be seen simply as recourse
to a social norm, i.e., as a reflection and enforcement of popular
preference, regardless of the fairness or unfairness of that preference." The

of individuals relating to homosexual conduct have been subject to state
'Decisions
"
intervention throughout the history of Western civilization. Condemnation of those
Blackstone
practices is firmly rooted in Judeo-Christian moral and ethical standards ....
than
malignity'
'deeper
of
described 'the infamous crime against nature' as an offense
concurring).
C.J.,
(Burger,
196-97
rape . . . ." Hardwick, 478 U.S. at
40 See id. at 198 n.2 (Powell, J., concurring) ("I cannot say that conduct condemned
for hundreds of years has now become a fundamental right."). Justice Blackmun,
however, vigorously asserted the opposite view:
Like Justice Holmes, I believe that "[i]t is revolting to have no better reason for
a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more
revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, and
the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past."
Id. at 199 (Blackmun, J., joined by Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, JJ., dissenting)
(quoting Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897)).
4' 208 U.S. 412, 421 (1908) (upholding state statute "protecting" women from
excessive working hours, notwithstanding the supposed constitutional freedom of workers
to contract, because of women's "physical structure [and] performance of maternal
functions").
42 90 S.E.2d 849 (Va. 1956) (upholding Virginia's ban on interracial marriages).
43 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (upholding racial segregation of public schools under a
"separate but equal" doctrine); see also Polikoff, supra note 10, at 555-56 ("The
supposed 'natural' order of society has been invoked in the past to support public policies
now recognizably based on sexist or racist ideology . . . : 'The paramount destiny and
mission of woman are to fulfill the noble and benign offices of wife and mother. This is
the law of the Creator."') (quoting Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141
(1872) (Bradley, J., concurring)).
4 See Polikoff, supra note 10, at 553 ("Although homosexuality continues to violate
social norms, often social norms are themselves immoral. Until recently, the social norms
of the American South included racially segregated bathrooms, restaurants, parks, and
other public places. The widespread existence of such practices and their codification into
law did not make them moral.") (footnote omitted).
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mere labeling of such a norm as "moral" does not make it so, even in
the utterance of a court. As Ronald Dworkin has suggested,
Even if it is true that most [people] think homosexuality an
abominable vice and cannot tolerate its presence, it remains
possible that this common opinion is a compound of
prejudice (resting on the assumption that homosexuals are
morally inferior creatures . . .), rationalization (based on

assumptions of fact so unsupported that they challenge the
community's own standards of rationality), and personal
aversion (representing no conviction but merely blind
hate ... ). It remains possible that the ordinary [person]

could produce no reason for his view, but would simply
parrot his neighbor who in turn parrots him ....If so, the

principles of democracy we follow do not call for an
enforcement of the consensus, for the belief that prejudices,
personal aversions and rationalizations do not justify
restricting another's freedom itself occupies a

. . .

funda-

mental position in our popular morality.45
Indeed, if the subject is normative or prescriptive morality, we cannot
ignore that "[t]he depth of the hatred and irrationality of the condemnation evoked by the sexual practices of parents ...

is in sharp contrast to

the legislative and judicial condonation of abusive physical behavior
towards spouses and children by their rejecting or ignoring it as a factor
in custody and visitation decisions. ' ' 41 Such an observation is certainly
accurate with regard to Virginia custody cases, in which we see some quite
extreme results. 47 These contrasts reveal either an inconsistency between
what courts preach and what they practice, or a deeper consistency
explained simply by a greater judicial aversion to homosexual love and
same-sex partnerships than to homicide and domestic violence. Either way,
the pattern hardly appears to deserve the name "moral."
C. The Harms-to-the-ChildRationale
A third basis for anti-gay custody decisions, i.e., fear of various harms
to the child, may appear in several guises. Sometimes the "harms" are
imagined, by courts both sympathetic and unsympathetic, to flow from the
45RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 254 (1977) (emphasis added).
46 Katheryn D. Katz, MajoritarianMorality and ParentalRights, 52 ALB. L. REV. 405,

461 (1988), cited in Polikoff, supra note 10, at 551 n.512.
47 See infra notes 131-49 and accompanying text.
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gay or lesbian parent's display of affection to his or her partner in the
child's presence, even if the display is well short of sexual intimacy.48
Even a parent's failure to keep his or her sexual orientation completely
from the child is sometimes made the basis for a finding of present or
potential adverse impact.49 These notions, by themselves, derive from the
same source as an inference of unsuitability or unfitness based on
"immorality," i.e., an ulterior subjective distaste for homosexual
relationships, and should be exposed and rejected on that ground alone.
However, courts also need to take account of newly available social
48

See, e.g., Charpentier v. Charpentier, 536 A.2d 948, 950 (Conn. 1988) (referring in

dicta to trial court's concern "not with [mother's lesbian] sexual orientation per se but
with its effect upon the children, who had observed in the home [unspecified]
inappropriate displays of physical affection between their mother and [her partner]");
Pennington v. Pennington, 596 N.E.2d 305, 306 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (practice of
"shield[ing] a child of tender age . . . from the sexual practices of the visiting parent,
whether . . . homosexual . . . or heterosexual" is "sound [and] designed to foster the
child's emotional well-being" and requires keeping an unmarried visiting parent's partner
out of the child's presence); In re Marriage of Walsh, 451 N.W.2d 492, 493 (Iowa 1990)
(implicitly banning public displays of affection, and perhaps forbidding father from
sharing information about his homosexuality with children, by resting ruling on father's
assurances that he would not expose children in any way to "lifestyle"); M.P. v.S.P.,
404 A.2d 1256, 1259 (N.J. 1979) (citing approvingly testimony of mother that she
"refrains from any demonstration of affection toward other women when [her children]
are present"); Chicoine v. Chicoine, 479 N.W.2d 891 (S.D. 1992) (discussed supra note
34).
The trial record in Bottoms contained uncontroverted testimony that no lesbian sexual
intimacy was ever carried on in the child's presence, but that the mother and her lover
declared their love for each other, kissed, hugged, and occasionally patted each other on
the bottom in the child's presence. Joint Appendix at 50, Bottoms v. Bottoms, No. 193093 (Va. Ct. App. filed Sept. 28, 1993); Trial Transcript at 48, Bottoms v. Bottoms (No.
CH93JA0517-00). The trial judge was convinced that these displays harmed the child.
Joint Appendix at 197-98; Trial Transcript at 195-96. He stated:
She readily admits her behavior in open affection shown to April Wade in front of
the child. Examples given were kissing, patting, all of this in the presence of the
child . . . I will tell you that it is the opinion of this Court that her conduct is
immoral. And it is the opinion of this Court that the conduct of Sharon Bottoms
renders her an unfit parent.
Id.; see supra note 32 and accompanying text.
41 See, e.g., Hodson v. Moore, 464 N.W.2d 699, 701-02 (Iowa App. 1990) (no per se
bar to custody for parent involved in discreet homosexual relationship). Here too the
courts sometimes use back-door reasoning, as for instance in Collins v. Collins, No. 87238-1I, 1988 WL 30173 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 30, 1988), in which the court decided
against the lesbian mother chiefly because she had evidently told the child not to be
ashamed of her lesbian lifestyle, but on the other hand not to discuss it with her
schoolmates. Id. at *1. In essence, the mother's own caution about others' opprobrium,
whether or not those sentiments in fact existed in the community, was turned against her
despite her own and the child's otherwise healthy attitudes.
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science research that concretely refutes every one of the common myths
about supposed "harms" to children of lesbian and gay households.50
As commentators have pointed out, 5' even a court not afflicted with
homophobic preoccupations may wonder whether a child stands to be
harmed from bias and prejudice against the gay or lesbian parent, and from
the arguable potential of such bias to injure the child even if the injury is
unfair. This concern, too, can be shown to be rooted not in fact but in
preconceived notions of the matter. It flies in the face both of the social
science research record5 2 and of the Supreme Court's reasoning on the
same point in another custody case, Palmore v. Sidoti. 3 The Court in
Palmore put the matter bluntly:
[The issue is] whether ...

private biases and the possible

injury they might inflict are permissible considerations for
removal of an infant child from the custody of its natural
mother. We have little difficulty concluding that they are
not. The Constitution cannot control such prejudices but
neither can it tolerate them. Private biases may be outside
'0 The harms alleged to flow to children of lesbian or gay households from the social
condemnation directed toward their parents, which Roe v. Roe, 324 S.E.2d 691 (Va.
1985), held to be "inevitable," have in fact proven to be non-existent. Research on the
growing number of children of lesbian or gay parents (much of it based on research
published after 1985 and therefore unavailable to the Roe court) fails to support the
assumptions Roe made about the inevitability and the harmfulness of community
disapproval or social pressure. In particular, all of the social science data available
indicate that the fear of harassment is far in excess of its actual incidence. See, e.g., Mary
E. Hotvedt & Jane Barclay Mandel, Children of Lesbian Mothers, in HOMOSEXUALITY:
SOCIAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL, AND BIOLOGICAL ISSUES 275, 282 (William Paul et al. eds.,
1982); Sharon L. Huggins, A Comparative Study of Self-Esteem of Adolescent Children
of Divorced Lesbian Mothers and Divorced Heterosexual Mothers, in HOMOSEXUALITY
AND THE FAMILY 123, 132 (Frederick W. Bozett ed., 1989); Susan Golombok et al.,
Children in Lesbian and Single-Parent Households: Psychosexual and Psychiatric
Appraisal, 24 J. CHILD PSYCHOL. & PSYCHIATRY 551, 565-67 (1983).
The social science research available to date is reviewed in Charlotte J. Patterson,
Children of Lesbian and Gay Parents, 63 CHILD DEV. 1025 (1992), and Gregory M.
Herek, Myths about Sexual Orientation:A Lawyer 's Guide to Social Science Research,
I LAW & SEXUALITY 133, 156 (1991), and is comprehensively summarized in the brief
prepared by Carolyn F. Corwin, E. Gary Spitko, and Christopher A. Crain of Covington
& Burling in Washington, D.C, for the American Psychological Association, the American
Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, the National Association of Social Workers,
and its Virginia chapter as amici curiae in the Bottoms appeal to the Virginia Court of
Appeals.
5' See Polikoff, supra note 10, at 567-72.
52 See supra note 50; infra notes 106-12 and accompanying text.
3 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
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the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or
indirectly, give them effect.5 4

Palmore invoked the strict scrutiny applicable to racial classifications
under equal protection to forbid the use of fear of community racial bias
as a criterion for denying custody of a child to an interracial couple.55
Palmore is not strictly controlling here, where racial classifications are not
involved.56 Nevertheless, the decision and its reasoning should carry great
moral weight with any jurist of conscience who wishes to avoid condoning
or appeasing private anti-gay biases in custody decisions. To slight or
ignore the command of Palmore in a gay-parenting case is effectively to
permit the homophobia of a party, or of society, to infect the decision.
This in turn perpetuates such bias and legitimates it for future cases and
for the culture generally.57
On this ground, sometimes citing Palmore expressly, a number of
decisions have held that the potential for social condemnation due to the
parent's sexual orientation, like the potential for similar condemnation
based on the parent's race or any other factor, is not a principled basis for
denying custody. "Simply put," declared one opinion, "it is impermissible to rely on any real or imagined social stigma attaching to the Mother's
status as a lesbian. ' 58 Said another: "This court cannot take into
14

Id. at 433.

5 See id. at 432-33.
56 Palmore is not, as is sometimes thought, rendered inapplicable in the present context
by Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). See infra notes 68-81 and accompanying
text.
" Cf. City of Clebume v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1985)
(quoting Palmore, 466 U.S. at 433, for the proposition that "[p]rivate biases may be
outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect").
The majority opinion in Cleburne is generally accepted to have ruled the appeasement of
individual prejudice to be an illegitimate criterion for state classifications even under the
rational basis test. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-3, at
1444 (2d ed. 1988).
In the present context, a principled application of this doctrine, sometimes called
"rational basis with bite," Pettinga, supra note 22, at 779 n.9, or "rational basis with
teeth," Stewart, supra note 22, at 112, ought to mean that even without heightened
scrutiny for anti-gay legislative or judicial classifications, the overwhelming social science
record on the relative sanguinity of outcomes among children of heterosexual and
homosexual households should, sooner or later, expose as irrational-and therefore
constitutionally invalid-a judicial presumption that lesbian or gay parents are, by virtue
of their orientation, less appropriate as child custodians than their heterosexual
counterparts. See supranote 50 and accompanying text; infra text accompanying notes 7172; infra notes 106-12 and accompanying text.
58 S.N.E. v. R.L.E., 699 P.2d 875, 879 (Alaska 1985) (citing Palmore, 446 U.S. at
433).
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consideration the unpopularity of homosexuals in society when its duty is
to facilitate and guard a fundamental parent-child relationship." 9
In one of the earliest decisions in this field, M.P. v. S.P., 60 the court
dealt specifically with the community disapproval problem by noting that
the difficulty would still exist even if the children lived away from the
homosexual parent, and that nothing in this regard could be gained by
sequestering the children physically from that parent:
[T]he children's exposure to embarrassment is not
dependent upon the identity of the parent with whom they
happen to reside. Their discomfiture, if any, comes about
not because of living with [their mother], but because she
is their mother, because she is a lesbian, and because the
community will not accept her. [None of these] will be
abated by a change of custody.61
The court went on to suggest that children raised by gay or lesbian
parents may well not be in the least harmed by the living arrangement, or
even by others' disapproval of it. 62 To the contrary, said the court,
It is just as reasonable to expect that they will emerge
better equipped to search out their own standards of right
and wrong, better able to perceive that the majority is not
always correct in its moral judgments, and better able to
understand the importance of conforming their beliefs to the
requirements of reason and tested knowledge, not the
constraints of currently popular sentiment or prejudice.
Taking the children from [their lesbian mother] ... will
foster in them a sense of shame . . . . Instead of courage
and the precept that people of integrity do not shrink from
bigots, it counsels the easy option of shirking difficult
problems and following the course of expedience. ...
We conclude that the children's best interests will be
disserved by undermining in this way their growth [into]
mature and principled adults.63

5' Conkel v. Conkel, 509 N.E.2d 983, 987 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987).
60 404 A.2d 1256 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979).
61 Id. at 1262.
62 Id. at 1260, 1262.
63 Id. at 1263.
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And a notable Massachusetts decision, Bezio v. Patenaude,64
crystallized the issue this way:
A finding that a parent is unfit to further the welfare of
the child must be predicated upon parental behavior which
adversely affects the child. The State may not deprive
parents of custody of their children "simply because their
households fail to meet the ideals approved by the
community . . . [or] simply because the parents embrace

ideologies or pursue life-styles at odds with the average.""
Bezio and M.P. v. S.P. reflect the emerging consensus of courts around
the nation 66 that a presumption of harm to a child of a gay or lesbian parent is unprincipled and improper. Additionally, current social science research evidence unequivocally demonstrates, to what should be the satisfaction of any remaining doubter, that as a factual matter the effects on
children of private bias against their gay or lesbian parents are
negligible.67
D. Equal Protection: The Arguments Take Shape
Our discussion has already suggested a number of constitutional
problems with any court-imposed presumption-whether in parent-vs.parent or third-party cases-that gay parents are "unfit" or less suitable
as child custodians than their non-gay counterparts. 68 Beyond the due
process and first amendment difficulties already discussed, a Roe-type rule
presents equal protection problems that are assuredly not put to rest by the
Supreme Court's ruling in Bowers v. Hardwick,6 9 which did no more nor

410 N.E.2d 1207 (Mass. 1980).
Id. at 1216 (citation omitted).
66 Note that for a time, at least, that consensus included the Supreme Court of
Virginia. See infra notes 89-90, 92 and accompanying text (Bezio quoted with approval
in Doe v. Doe, 284 S.E.2d 799 (Va. 1981), but ignored in Roe v. Roe, 324 S.E.2d 691
(Va. 1985)).
67 See Frederick W. Bozett, Gay Fathers: A Review of the Literature, in
HOMOSEXUALITY AND THE FAMILY 137, 143-44, 148 (Frederick W. Bozett ed., 1989);
Richard Green, Sexual Identity of 37 Children Raised by Homosexual or Transsexual
Parents, 135 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 692, 695-96 (June 1978) [hereinafter Green, Sexual
Identity] (limited and transitory teasing reported by three of 21 children in study); Brian
Miller, Gay Fathers and their Children, 28 FAM. COORDINATOR 544, 548 (1979).
68 See supra notes 16, 22, 30-33, 53-55 and accompanying text.
69 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
64

65
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less than refuse to extend the substantive due process right of privacy to
homosexual sodomy.7"
First, as just discussed, the current social science research record
conclusively demonstrates the factual untenability of any assumption that
children are harmed by the experience of growing up in the custody of
lesbian or gay rather than heterosexual adults.7 If such an assumption is
factually insupportable, it lacks a rational basis and thus fails the most
permissive test of state regulation under equal protection.72
Second, heightened scrutiny for a state's sexual orientation classifications is not, as is sometimes thought, necessarily foreclosed by the due
process holding of Hardwick.73 Anti-gay presumptions as to child custody
have equal protection dimensions as well, and such arguments may well
not have been precluded by that decision. After all, the Hardwick Court
did not hold that classifications that burden homosexuals never violate
equal protection; nor did it explicitly close the door to a future requirement
of heightened scrutiny for one or more such classifications. Due process
and equal protection doctrines have decidedly different roots and purposes,
a fact that affords courts some room to interpret the two commands
differently.74
State courts determining child custody should not be able to
discriminate against homosexual parents merely because, so long as
Hardwick remains the law, the due process clause is not recognized to

Id. at 191.
7' See supra notes 50, 67 and accompanying text; infra notes 106-12 and
accompanying text.
72 See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
" See, e.g., Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Upholding the FBI
policy of considering homosexual conduct a significant or dispositive factor in
employment decisions, the court stated:
It would be quite anomolous [sic], on its face, to declare status defined by conduct
that states may constitutionally criminalize as deserving of strict scrutiny under the
equal protection clause ....
If the Court [in Hardwick] was unwilling to object to
state laws that criminalize the behavior that defines the class, it is hardly open to
a lower court to conclude that state sponsored discrimination against the class is
invidious.
Id. at 103, quoted in Sunstein, supra note 15, at 1161-62.
" See Watkins v. United States Army, 847 F.2d 1329, 1349 (9th Cir. 1988)
(homosexuality is a suspect classification), vacated and aff'd on other grounds, 875 F.2d
699 (1989) (en banc), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 957 (1990); Sunstein, supra note 15, at 1161.
The debate, however, is far from over, even among advocates of gay and lesbian civil
rights. For a provocative discussion of the equal protection implications of the overlap
between the class of those who consider themselves homosexual and the class of those
who engage in homosexual sodomy, see Nan D. Hunter, Life After Hardwick, 27 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 531, 545-46 (1992). See also infra notes 79, 81 and accompanying text.
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afford those persons a right to engage in consensual homosexual acts in
private, and does not prohibit states from criminalizing that conduct. The
argument has been made that, in child custody disputes at least, taking
adverse account of the gender of a custodian's domestic partner where it
is the same as the custodian's, but not where it is different, makes a
gender-based classification that fails to withstand the "intermediate""
scrutiny that is accorded to gender classifications under equal protection.76
The debate over heightened scrutiny for certain classifications under
equal protection harkens back to the famous phrase "discrete, insular
minorities, 77 i.e., societal subgroups whose members suffer disadvantages
by virtue of immutable characteristics such as race or gender.78 Although
the matter is the subject of impassioned moral, social, and scientific debate
in today's lesbian and gay community, 79 it must be noted that some
75 Courts applying this level of scrutiny will review a classification for
a
"substantial" (i.e., less than "necessary" but more than merely "rational")
relationship to an "important" (i.e., less than "compelling" but more than merely
"legitimate") governmental interest. See, e.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan,
458 U.S. 718 (1982); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404
U.S. 71 (1971).
76 See Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 186.
The (Georgia] legislature having decided that the sex of the participants is irrelevant
to the legality of the acts, I do not see why the State can defend [its gender-neutral
sodomy prohibition] on the ground that individuals singled out for prosecution are
of the same sex as their partners. Thus, under the circumstances of this case, a
claim under the Equal Protection Clause may well be available without having to
reach the more controversial question whether homosexuals are a suspect class.
Id. at 203 n.2 (Blackmun, J., joined by Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, JJ., dissenting)
(citing Rowland v. Mad River Local Sch. Dist., 470 U.S. 1009 (1985) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari)); see also Elvia Rosales Arriola, Sexual Identity and
the Constitution:Homosexual Persons as a Discrete and Insular Minority, 10 WOMEN'S
RTS. L. REP. 143, 155-56 (1988); Custody Denials, supra note 31, at 626-30; Harris M.
Miller, II, Note, An Argument for the Application of Equal ProtectionHeightenedScrutiny
to ClassificationsBased on Homosexuality, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 797, 800-02 (1984); Note,
The Constitutional Status of Sexual Orientation: Homosexuality as a Suspect
Classification, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1285, 1287 (1985).
77 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938); see also City
of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 471-72 (1985) (Marshall, J.,
joined by Brennan and Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(suggesting that either "heightened scrutiny or 'second-order' rational basis review"
would be the 'more searching judicial inquiry"' referred to in the Carolene Products
footnote, i.e., "a method of approaching certain classifications skeptically").
71 See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 150 (1980); TRIBE, supra note 57,

§ 16-33, at 1616.
" See John D'Emilio, Making and Unmaking Minorities: The Tensions between Gay
Politics and History, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 915, 921 (1986); Custody
Denials, supra note 31, at 622-23 (arguing that the assumption that sexual orientation "is
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emerging biological evidence suggests that sexual orientation in humans
is at least partly innate."0 Proof along these lines may someday be part of
a successful "immutable characteristics" challenge to the reasoning and
result of Hardwick, although such an argument may well be unnecessary
to an equal protection analysis since immutability of the defining
characteristic of a class may not be indispensable to protected status for
that class.8

a 'defining characteristic ...

essential to personhood' depends on and emphasizes rigid

sexual orientation categories that are 'central to the oppression' of those [defined] as
different") (footnotes omitted).
'0 Chandler Burr, Homosexuality and Biology, ATLANTIC, Mar. 1993, at 47, 52-58;
Meredith F. Small, The gay debate: is homosexuality a matter of choice or chance?, AM.
HEALTH, Mar. 1993, at 70, 70-71. This view, and a discussion of its equal protection
implications, was advanced in Watkins v. United States Army, 847 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir.
1988), vacated and aff'd on other grounds, 875 F.2d 699 (1989) (en banc), cert. denied,
498 U.S. 957 (1990).
Although the causes of homosexuality are not fully understood, scientific research
indicates that we have little control over our sexual orientation and that, once
acquired, our sexual orientation is largely impervious to change. Scientific proof
aside, it seems appropriate to ask whether heterosexuals feel capable of changing
their sexual orientation. Would heterosexuals living in a city that passed an
ordinance banning those who engaged in or desired to engage in sex with persons
of the opposite sex find it easy not only to abstain from heterosexual activity but
also to shift the object of their sexual desires to persons of the same sex?
Id. at 1347-48 (citations omitted).
S The immutability of class characteristics has been cited as a requirement for suspect
or quasi-suspect status for classifications in such cases as Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635,
638 (1986), and Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973). Commentators have
nevertheless suggested that uniform reliance on this criterion is inappropriate and
potentially dangerous. See Custody Denials, supra note 31, at 624 (citing Laurence H.
Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-BasedConstitutionalTheories, 89 YALE L.J.
1063, 1073, 1074 n.52 (1980) ("features like immutability are neither sufficient nor
necessary"; "even if race or gender became readily mutable by biomedical means, I
would suppose that laws burdening those who choose to remain black or female would
properly remain constitutionally suspect")).
Another reason it might not be fair to apply an immutability theory to preclude suspect
status for sexual orientation classifications is that persons of minority sexual orientation
have significant social or cultural bonds to one another that derive affirmatively, not just
as a matter of defensive necessity, from their defining common characteristic; to strip a
classification of suspect status where it binds class members together in this way
implicates both intimate and expressive association interests, see Kenneth L. Karst, The
Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624, 682-86 (1980) (intimate association);
David A. Richards, ConstitutionalLegitimacy and ConstitutionalPrivacy, 61 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 800, 853 (1986) (same), that are arguably similar to those that ought to ensure
continued protection for Professor Tribe's right to "choose to remain" black or female.
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III. DOE V. DOE82 AND ROE V. ROE: 83 THE LAY OF THE LAND IN VIRGINIA

The Virginia precedent encountered in the appeal of Sharon Bottoms'
case has been particularly troubling, not only because of the irrebuttable
presumption language of Roe,84 but because Roe itself represented
something of a shift in direction for Virginia's highest court. In 1981, in
Doe, the court had held that a natural parent's homosexual orientation
should not dictate a surrender of her residual parental rights to her former
husband's new wife by adoption.85 The Doe court declined to decide
whether the same lesbian parent would be adjudged suitable as a
custodian,86 but did hold that any possible adverse effects of a parent's
homosexuality could not be assumed without specific proof:
If Jane Doe is an unfit parent, it is solely her lesbian relationship which renders her unfit, and this must be to such
an extent as to make the continuance of the parent-child relationship heretofore existing between her and her son detrimental to the child's welfare. The petitioners introduced
no evidence, scientific or otherwise, to establish this fact.
Regardless of how offensive we may find [the mother's]
life-style, its effect on her son's welfare is not a matter of
which we can take judicial notice. We take judicial notice
of generally known or easily ascertainable facts.8 7
The Doe court thus employed the so-called "nexus" rule common to
the better-reasoned decisions around the country,88 i.e., a rule requiring a
82 284 S.E.2d 799

(Va. 1981).

83 324 S.E.2d 691

(Va. 1985).

84

Id. at 694.

85

Doe, 284 S.E.2d at 804-05.
See id. at 806; Roe, 324 S.E.2d at 694 (noting that the court in Doe stopped short

86

of finding the lesbian mother a fit and proper custodian).
87 Doe, 284 S.E.2d at 805 (citation omitted).
88 The following are other "nexus" decisions, i.e., holdings which have considered
a parent's lesbian or gay sexual orientation to be problematic in a custody determination
only where there is proof of an adverse effect on the child: S.N.E. v. R.L.B., 699 P.2d

875, 878-79 (Alaska 1985); Birdsall v. Birdsall, 243 Cal. Rptr. 287, 288-90 (Cal. Ct. App.
1988); Nadler v. Superior Court, 63 Cal. Rptr. 352, 354 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967); D.H. v.
J.H., 418 N.E.2d 286, 293 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981); Peyton v. Peyton, 457 So. 2d 321, 32325 (La. Ct. App. 1984); Bezio v. Patenaude, 410 N.E.2d 1207, 1215-16 (Mass. 1980);
M.P. v. S.P., 404 A.2d 1256, 1260-61 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979); Guinan v.
Guinan, 477 N.Y.S.2d 830, 831-32 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984); Conkel v. Conkel, 509 N.E.2d
983, 986-87 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987); Stroman v. Williams, 353 S.E.2d 704, 705-06 (S.C.
Ct. App. 1987); In re Marriage of Cabalquinto, 669 P.2d 886, 888 (Wash. 1983).
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showing of adverse effects on the child as essential to a reallocation of
parental rights. As to the need for evidence of harm, the court in Doe
quoted liberally from the decision in Bezio v. Patenaude,89 a custody case
whose record contained expert evidence that a custodial parent's sexual
orientation, standing alone, was "irrelevant" to parenting ability. 90
With Roe, decided only four years later, the same court appeared to
abandon the "nexus" approach as it launched a lethal attack, through the
opening as to custody created in Doe, against day-to-day parenting by gays
and lesbians. In terms as sweeping as they were unsupported, the Roe court
insisted that a natural parent's homosexual relationship was an absolute
bar to custody of the parent's own child:
The father's continuous exposure of the child to his
immoral and illicit relationship renders him an unfit and
improper custodian as a matter of law. . . . We have no
hesitancy in saying that the conditions under which this
child must live daily are not only unlawful but also impose
an intolerable burden upon her by reason of the social
condemnation attached to them, which will inevitably afflict
her relationships with her peers and with the community at
large. 9'
The Roe opinion is particularly frustrating because it completely
ignored the holding of Doe that a showing of harm to the child from the
natural parent's homosexual lifestyle was required before the parent's
rights could be abridged.92 The court also ignored its prior reliance on
89
90

410 N.E.2d 1207 (Mass. 1980).
Doe, 284 S.E.2d at 806 (quoting Bezio, 410 N.E.2d at 1215-16).

9' Roe, 324 S.E.2d at 694 (citing Jacobson v. Jacobson, 314 N.W.2d 78 (N.D. 1981);
M.J.P. v. J.G.P., 640 P.2d 966 (Okla. 1982); Kallas v. Kallas, 614 P.2d 641 (Utah
1980)).
Neither the opinion in Roe nor those in Jacobson, M.J.P., or Kallas relied on social
science evidence concerning the harms to children that Roe pronounced as
"inevitabl[e]." Roe, 324 S.E.2d at 694. The principal studies cited in the Bottoms
litigation were published after all three of the decisions cited in Roe were rendered. See
infra notes 107-12 and accompanying text.
92 Doe was an adoption case in which the proper legal standard was the outright
unfitness of a parent, as in a termination proceeding, rather than the relative suitability of
the parents, as in custody determinations between two natural parents. See PETER N.
SWISHER ET AL., VIRGINIA FAMILY LAW: THEORY AND PRACTICE § 15-7 (1991 & Supp.
1993). The court in Roe, however, if it meant to use the "unfitness" language of its own
termination cases, should have tested for "nexus." In actuality Roe did not employ a test
at all, but simply declared that harm to the child was "inevitabl[e]." Roe, 324 S.E.2d
at 694. In any event, other courts that have applied the "nexus" rule have done so in
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Bezio, and essentially created an irreconcilable schism with its reasoning
in Doe without explicitly overruling that decision.
Besides illustrating extremely poor reasoning in service of an apparent
bias against homosexuals, Roe is of interest because it used-indeed,
brazenly conflated-all three of the rationales for anti-gay custody
decisions discussed earlier in this Article. The Roe court referred to one
of its prior decisions disfavoring an adulterous spouse as custodian,93 and
then declared that homosexual relationships, like adulterous ones, were
"immoral and illicit,'' 94 and that exposure of a child to such a
relationship rendered the lesbian or gay parent an unfit custodian "as a
95
matter of law."
The Roe court first presumed the illicitness of the natural father's gay
relationship, as though with a wave of the hand an indictment and
conviction for sodomy or some other sexual conduct offense had been
included in the record.96 The court also pronounced the gay parent's
relationship "immoral," 97 without even the dubious historical or cultural
references used as support for a few decisions from other jurisdictions.98
And the court presumed that the child whose custody was at issue would
be harmed by exposure to the natural father's gay relationship, 99 as though
the proposition were self-evident and needed no support from the social
science research record or from the facts of the case. These bits of
"reasoning" taken together formed the basis for the conclusive,
irrebuttable presumption of unfitness for which Roe has been taken to
stand.l °°
Whether the anti-gay presumption of Roe is indeed irrebuttable, and to
what situations it applies, are matters of interpretation made more difficult
by the sheer nonsense of the central holding of the opinion. In the first
instance, a finding of "unfitness" is normally made only in termination

custody and adoption or termination cases without distinction. See supra note 88 and
accompanying text.
13 Roe, 324 S.E.2d at 693 (citing Brown v. Brown, 237 S.E.2d 89, 91-92 (Va.
1977)
(affirming grant of custody to father where mother lived in adulterous relationship)).
94Roe, 324 S.E.2d at 694.
95 id.
96 Id.; see supra notes 22-23, 74 and accompanying text. It is no crime to "be"
a
homosexual. Cf. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962) (status of narcotic
addiction cannot constitutionally be criminalized).
9'Roe, 324 S.E.2d at 693-94.
98 See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192-94 (1986).
9'See Roe, 324 S.E.2d at 693.
00 See Note, Developments in the Law--Sexual Orientation and the Law, 102 HARV.
L. REV. 1508, 1631 n.13 (1989) (referring to Roe presumption as "apparently

irrebuttable").
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of parental rights proceedings,1 °1 and is patently out of place in a custody
dispute, where no such finding is necessary to the disposition." °2 In
particular, where the rivals for custody are natural parents on an equal
legal footing, as was the case in Roe, neither parent need be found
"unfit" in order for the court to choose which of them is the preferable
custodian. 3 This finding of relative suitability is quite different from a
finding that one or the other parent is unfit to have anything to do with the
child, as custodian or otherwise.
Because an "unfitness" finding was unnecessary to the result in Roe,
the court's pronouncement that the natural father's homosexual
relationship made him an "unfit" custodian, rather than merely a less
preferable one,1 4 was mere dicta. Moreover, the Roe decision did not deal
with a third-party situation, or one in which a custody-seeker was evidently
otherwise impaired or unsuitable for reasons other than sexual orientation.
However, a literal reading of the language of Roe would dictate that its
per se rule be applied in every case in which a party seeking custody has
a gay or lesbian relationship, no matter how well qualified he or she is,
who his or her rival for custody is and in what relationship to the child he
or she stands, or how preferable the rival is as a custodian by any other
measure. A literal interpretation of Roe would permit no exceptions for, say,
a non-gay rival for custody who had already been found unfit to have
residual parental rights over another child. It would accord any party with
standing to sue for custody, even the state, 10 5 an interest in the child that
was instantly and automatically superior to that of the gay or lesbian parent.
If Roe applied across the board, no one would be a less appropriate
custodian than the gay or lesbian parent-not the murderer, not the
psychotic, not the child molester, not the cannibal. It defies credulity to
'0' See Doe, 284 S.E.2d at 806 ("proof of [mother's] unorthodox life-style did not
outweigh the clear and convincing evidence that she is a devoted mother and, in every
other respect, a fit parent").
102 The use of the term "unfit" in cases enunciating the parental presumption in thirdparty custody cases is no accident; it is used precisely to make the presumption strong
enough that it requires an award of custody to the natural parent unless that parent is
found unfit in the same sense that grounds a decision to terminate his or her residual
rights to the child. See, e.g., Bailes v. Sours, 340 S.E.2d 824, 827 (Va. 1986). For further
discussion, see infra notes 116, 131-50 and accompanying text.
103 See Elder v. Evans, 427 6.E.2d 745, 747 (Va. Ct. App. 1993).
1o Roe, 324 S.E.2d at 694.
105 VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.2 (Michie 1990 & Supp. 1993) (grandparents, stepparents,
and other family members with a "legitimate interest" may intervene in custody
proceedings); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-283(A) (Michie 1988 & Supp. 1993) (termination
of residual parental rights by court must be by order "continuing or granting custody to
a local board of public welfare or social services, to a licensed child-placing agency or
the granting of custody or guardianship to a relative or other interested individual").
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suggest such a rule in a civilized society. Assuming the Roe court did not
harbor a homophobia this barbaric, at the very least it failed to consider
the ramifications of the per se rule it uttered into the law. A presumption
of "unfitness" based on sexual orientation, as the Roe court should have
realized, is totally unworkable in practice.
As we now know, the presumption is also unfounded in fact. A
considerable body of social science research, some of it available when
Roe was decided10 6 but most of it published in the years since the decision,
has by now decisively refuted any notion that children of lesbian or gay
parents are adversely affected by anything in their parents' lifestyle. The
research literature on outcomes in these children has measured everything from gender identification"0 7 to personal development 0 8 to peer
'06 See Brief for Amici Curiae American Civil Liberties Union of Northern Virginia,
Center for Constitutional Rights, Lesbian Rights Project, and Women's Legal Defense
Fund at 10-11, Roe v. Roe, 324 S.E.2d 691 (Va. 1985) (No. 832044) (citing NATIONAL

INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH TASK FORCE ON HOMOSEXUALITY, FINAL REPORT AND
BACKGROUND PAPER 15, 56 (1972) (homosexual orientation, by itself, is not a determinant

of mental health, personal stability, or parenting ability)); Bernice Goodman, The Lesbian
Mother, 43 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 283, 283-84 (1973); Martha Kirkpatrick et al.,
Lesbian Mothers and Their Children: A Comparative Survey, 51 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 545, 545 (1981) (finding no correlation between the parent's sexual orientation
and that of the child); Charles Silverstein, Even Psychiatry Can Profit from Its Past
Mistakes, 2 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 153, 157 (1976) (discussing decision of American
Psychiatric Association to remove homosexuality from its list of mental disorders given
that "not one objective study, by any researcher, in any country ....
substantiates the
theory of homosexual pathology"); R.L. Rees, A Comparison of Children of Lesbian and
Single Heterosexual Mothers on Three Measures of Socialization (1979) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, California School of Professional Psychology) (findings showed no
significant difference among children based on mother's sexual preference).
107 Patterson, supra note 50, at 1030 (citing and discussing Julie S. Gottman, Children

of Gay and Lesbian Parents, in

HOMOSEXUALITY AND FAMILY RELATIONS

177, 189

(Frank W. Bozett & Marvin B. Sussman eds., 1990) (no significant differences in gender
role preferences between adult daughters of lesbian mothers and those of divorced
heterosexual mothers, remarried or not); Golombok et al., supra note 50, at 562 (children,
regardless of parental sexual orientation, were happy with their gender and had no wish
to be a member of the opposite sex); Green, Sexual Identity, supra note 67, at 692;
Richard Green et al., Lesbian Mothers and Their Children: A Comparison with Solo
Parent Heterosexual Mothers and Their Children, 15 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 167
(1986) [hereinafter Green et al., Comparison];Kirkpatrick et al., supra note 106, at 545;
Rees, supra note 106).
'08 Golombok et al., supra note 50, at 565 (no difference between children of lesbian
and heterosexual mothers with regard to hyperactivity, unsociability, emotional difficulty,
and conduct problems); Green et al., Comparison,supra note 107, at 174 (no differences
in intelligence); Barbara M. McCandlish, Against All Odds: Lesbian Mother Family
Dynamics, in GAY AND LESBIAN PARENTS, supra note 10, at 23, 30 (no difference
between children of lesbian couples and children of heterosexual couples in independence,
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and has
relations °9 to self-esteem'1 to future sexual orientation,'
uniformly found that children raised by gay or lesbian adults do not turn
out any differently from their counterparts raised by heterosexual adults." 2
There is simply no factual basis for a conclusion that a parent's gay
or lesbian lifestyle harms a child. At a minimum, the court in Roe made
its anti-gay pronouncement in an environment far shorter on social science
fact, and far more vulnerable to subjective impressions, than would be true
today. If Roe were subjected to reexamination in light of current
understanding, and if that understanding were allowed to guide the later
ego functions, or object relations); Ailsa Steckel, Psychosocial Development of Children
of Lesbian Mothers, in GAY AND LESBIAN PARENTS, supra note 10, at 75, 82-83 (similar
findings).
.09Golombok et al., supra note 50, at 564 (children reported mostly same-sex peer
groups regardless of parents' sexual orientation; overall peer relations ratings were no
different for two groups of children); Green, Sexual Identity, supra note 67, at 696 (gender
distribution of friends of children of lesbian mothers was similar to that of children of
heterosexual mothers); Green et al., Comparison, supra note 107, at 178 (self-ratings and
parents' ratings of children's peer popularity did not differ depending on parental sexual
orientation).
"0 Huggins, supra note 50, at 132-35 (no differences between children of heterosexual
and lesbian mothers in any aspect of self-concept); D. Puryear, A Comparison Between
the Children of Lesbian Mothers and the Children of Heterosexual Mothers (1983)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, California School of Professional Psychology); Rees,
supra note 106 (no difference in development of children's moral judgment depending
on parental sexual orientation).
...Golombok et al., supra note 50, at 564 (no difference in sexual orientation between
children of homosexuals and those of heterosexuals); Gottman, supra note 107, at 189
(same); Green, Sexual Identity, supra note 67, at 693 (pre-adolescent and adolescent
children of lesbians had exclusively heterosexual fantasies); Huggins, supra note 50, at
134 (no difference in sexual orientation between children of homosexuals and those of
heterosexuals); Miller, supra note 67, at 546-47 (among 48 adult offspring of gay fathers,
4% were gay or lesbian which is comparable to the proportion of homosexuals in the
general population); Rees, supra note 106 (adolescent children of lesbian mothers had
uniformly heterosexual orientation).
12 Patterson sums up the current research record as follows:
There is no evidence to suggest that psychosocial development among children of
gay men or lesbians is compromised in any respect to that among offspring of
heterosexual parents. Despite long-standing legal presumptions against gay and
lesbian parents in many states, despite dire predictions about their children based
on well-known theories of psychosocial development, and despite the accumulation
of a substantial body of research investigating these issues, not a single study has
found children of gay and lesbian parents to be disadvantaged in any significant
respect relative to children of heterosexual parents. Indeed, the evidence to date
suggests that home environments provided by gay and lesbian parents are as likely
as those provided by heterosexual parents to support and enable children's
psychological growth.
Patterson, supra note 50, at 1036.
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court's reasoning, the presumption against gay and lesbian custodians
would surely fall.
IV. ROE V. ROE 1 3 AND BOTTOMS V. BOTTOMS:' 14 THE THIRD-PARTY
PROBLEM

Had Sharon Bottoms' rival for custody been her child's natural father,
the facts of her case would have been essentially identical to those of Roe.
But the rival was Sharon's mother," 5 who, like any nonparent, was a legal
stranger to the child. Virginia, like many other states, has a strong
presumption favoring the natural parent over the third party in such
disputes. 16 That presumption, as Virginia cases have repeatedly reaffirmed,
can be overcome only by clear and convincing evidence of the unfitness117
of the natural parent.'18 Because Bottoms was a conflict between a natural
parent and a third party, Roe can be distinguished, and its vitality
questioned, from a new perspective-that of opposition to any extension of
the Roe pronouncement beyond parent-vs.-parent disputes into legal
spheres governed by countervailing presumptions and burdens of proof.
Nevertheless, the same arguments against Roe were made before the Court
of Appeals" 9 that would be advanced in a direct challenge to Roe in the
Supreme Court of Virginia: that the presumption against gay custodians
113 324

S.E.2d 691 (Va. 1985).

114 No. 1930-93 (Va. Ct. App. filed Sept. 28, 1993).
115 See supra note 2.
116See

supra note 102 and accompanying text; infra notes 123-29 and accompanying

text.
"' Bailes v. Sours, 340 S.E.2d 824, 827 (Va. 1986). Unfitness in this context is the
same as unfitness in proceedings to terminate parental rights, and the same parental
presumption applies in both. See VA. CODE. ANN. § 16.1-283(B) (Michie 1988); Lowe v.
Department of Pub. Welfare, 343 S.E.2d 70, 72 (Va. 1986); Walker v. Department of Pub.
Welfare, 290 S.E.2d 887, 890 (Va. 1982); SWISHER, supra note 92, § 15-7 & n.23.
Unfitness need not be adjudicated in custody disputes between parents, where the court
must typically decide the relative suitability of two apparently adequate custodians. A
determination of unfitness is proper only on a showing of deficiencies much more severe
than those needed to support a change of custody from one natural parent to another. See
supra note 102; infra notes 123-29 and accompanying text.
118 See infra notes 121-23 and accompanying text.
119 Briefs of appellant and supporting amici curiae were filed November 15, 1993.
There were three amici filings: a brief from the American Psychological Association et
al., see supra note 50, which collected the social science evidence and concluded that
there is none to support an inference that a parent's sexual orientation is harmful to a
child and that there are convincing and oft-replicated empirical findings to the contrary;
and briefs from the National Center for Lesbian Rights et al. and the American Academy
of Matrimonial Lawyers, which made nationwide surveys of the caselaw, argued against
the presumption of Roe, and recommended implementation of a "nexus" rule.
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has no social science support for any purpose; that it is irrational, a pure
reflection of bias and prejudice; and that it should be rejected, treated as
certainly not extended to new
a dead letter, or limited to its facts, and
120
damage.
further
do
cases where it can
Bottoms illuminates with unique clarity the irreconcilable tension
between a Roe-type custody presumption and the rest of Virginia domestic
relations law. The Virginia Supreme Court, for better or worse, presumes
that a "child's best interests will be served when in the custody of its
parent."' 12' The court has repeatedly spoken of the superior "place of a
mother's love, devotion, attention and supervision" in her child's life, and
the mother's "natural right to have and enjoy the companionship and care
,, The same court has described the
of her own flesh and blood .
rights of parents as 'founded upon natural justice and wisdom, and being
essential to the peace, order, virtue and happiness of society."' 123 This
"the
rule leads to a presumption that parental custody is preferable, and
'
presumption favoring a parent over a non-parent is a strong one. 124
The parental presumption is particularly strong when a third party
seeks to deprive a parent of the custody of his or her child. 25
In order to
120

Appellant's Opening Brief at 12-21, Bottoms (No. 1930-93); Amici Curiae Brief

of American Psychological Association et al. at 8-24, Bottoms (No. 1930-93); Amicus
Curiae Brief of National Center for Lesbian Rights et al. at 25-32, Bottoms (No.
1930-93).
121 Judd v. Van Horn, 81 S.E.2d 432, 436 (Va. 1954); accord Doe v. Doe, 284
S.E.2d
799, 800 (Va. 1981) (deciding parent-vs.-third-party adoption case based on analogy to
parental presumption in custody cases; quoting Cunningham v. Gray, 273 S.E.2d 562, 564
(Va. 1981) (.'[W]hile the welfare of the child is of paramount concern in adoption cases,
nonetheless the rights of a natural parent vis-a-vis a non-parent will be maintained if at
all consistent with the child's best interests."')) (other citations omitted).
22 Lawson v. Lawson, 94 S.E.2d 215, 219 (Va. 1956) (denying uncle and aunt's
petition for transfer of custody from natural mother); see also Judd, 81 S.E.2d at 435
(right to custody of the son is ordinarily the father's right "both by nature and by law");
Williams v. Williams, 66 S.E.2d 500, 502-03 (Va. 1951) ("The rights of the parents
being founded on nature are respected unless they have been abandoned or
relinquished."); Sutton v. Menges, 44 S.E.2d 414, 417 (Va. 1947) ("To separate a child
from its parents, the evidence of their unfitness must be cogent and convincing.");
Merritt v. Swimely, 82 Va. 433, 436 (1886) ("duties thrown upon [the father] by, the law
of nature as well as of society"). In Ferris v. Underwood, 348 S.E.2d 18 (Va. Ct. App.
1986), the court reversed as improper a transfer of custody of the child from her mother
to her grandmother, stressing that "[olur holding.., has the effect of re-establishing for
[the child] the proper roles of her mother and her grandmother." Id. at 20-21 (emphasis
added).
123 Bailes v. Sours, 340 S.E.2d 824, 827 (Va. 1986) (quoting Walker v. Brooks,
124
S.E.2d 195, 198 (1962)).
124 Id.
125

id.
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rebut this parental presumption, a third party must prove by clear and
convincing evidence (1) that the natural parent is unfit, (2) that the natural
parent has already been divested of custody, (3) that the natural parent has
voluntarily relinquished custody, (4) that the natural parent has abandoned
the child, or (5) that special circumstances present a truly extraordinary
26
reason for taking the child away from the parent.1
To rebut the parental presumption by proving "special circumstances," the third party must prove by clear and convincing evidence-not
merely by "surmise and conjecture"' 27-that the child will be seriously
harmed if he or she remains in the parent's custody. 128 If the parental
presumption is rebutted, then the court must make a further, separate
determination as to whether the best interests of the child require a transfer
29
of custody to the third party.
No appellate court in the United States has yet held that a natural
parent's same-sex relationship satisfies both these standards and requires
transfer of custody to a third party. Indeed, courts in Virginia and across
the nation have applied the parental presumption to insulate natural parents
from third-party custody challenges in a variety of extreme situations. 3 °
The point is starkly illustrated by a group of Virginia cases that can
only be described as grotesque. In Mason v. Moon,'3 ' a child's grandparents sued to take custody from his mother and stepfather, claiming that
the mother's household was unfit for the child for the simple reason that
the stepfather had killed the child's natural father. 32 The Virginia
intermediate appellate court reversed a lower court's award of custody to
the grandparents, and specifically declined to hold that the child would be
harmed by living with his father's killer: "There is no credible evidence
in the record which would indicate that granting custody of the child to
[the mother] would harm the child psychologically .... A parent and child
will not be deprived of one another based on surmise and conjecture."'33
126 Id.
127

Mason v. Moon, 385 S.E.2d 242, 246 (Va. Ct. App. 1989).

121

Id. at 245.

129

Wilkerson v. Wilkerson, 200 S.E.2d 581, 583 (Va. 1973).
See, e.g., in re James M., 135 Cal. Rptr. 222, 229 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976) (affirming

13

award of custody to natural father who had been convicted of murdering his children's
mother by stabbing her 22 times); In re Lutgen, 532 N.E.2d 976, 986 (Ill. Ct. App. 1988)
(upholding grant of custody to natural father who had been convicted of choking the
children's mother to death in their presence); In re Welfare of P.L.C. & D.L.C., 384
N.W.2d 222, 226-27 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (granting custody to natural father
notwithstanding evidence of his alcoholism and child and spouse abuse).

385 S.E.2d 242 (Va. Ct. App. 1989).
132 Id. at 243.
133 Id. at 246 (emphasis added).
131
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In Walker v. Fagg,'3 4 grandparents attempted to rebut the presumption
in favor of the natural father by claiming he was unfit because he had been
unemployed and neglected his family, had abused alcohol, and had abused
his wife and ultimately killed her.1 35 The trial court granted temporary
custody to the father pending appeal of his murder conviction, and the
court of appeals affirmed.'3 6 The court said simply that the best interests
of the children required that they remain temporarily with the father, and
stressed that the best interests inquiry is independent of the parental
presumption analysis, although it imposes on the third party a similarly
heightened burden of proof: "[A] determination of unfitness [does not]
require[ ] ipso facto a denial of parental custody . . . . '[T]he evidence
must also be clear and convincing that the welfare and best interests of the
child will7 be served by awarding custody to someone other than the
3
parent."'1
In Brown v. Kittle,138 the court reversed a denial of custody to a father
who had formerly drunk to excess, and was accused of fathering an
illegitimate child-in addition to the child whose custody was in
dispute-and of having sexual relations, allegedly forcible, with that child's
half-sister.139 The court disapproved of the father's behavior but refused to
let that disapproval substitute for proof of an adverse effect on the child:
We do not condone Brown's conduct either as a scofflaw
or as a violator of generally accepted standards of morality.
The evidence shows, however, that regardless of his
transgressions and moral lapses Brown has been a devoted
and dedicated father to Johnny and he and his remarkably
understanding wife have made a good home for the child. 40
In Elder v. Evans,'4' a mother had left her child in a nonparent's care.
for four years of its life'4 2 and had failed during that time to provide for

134

400 S.E.2d 208 (Va. Ct. App. 1991).

131

Id. at 210.

Id. at 209.
Id. at 211 (quoting Wilkerson v. Wilkerson, 200 S.E.2d 581, 583 (Va. 1973)).
138 303 S.E.2d 864 (Va. 1983).
136
131

"' Id. at 866.
Id. at 867; see also Phillips v. Kiraly, 105 S.E.2d 855, 859 (Va. 1958) (aunt and
uncle's petition for custody denied because parental presumption not overcome by general
allegations that father was financially irresponsible, took pictures of nude women, and had
been a "Peeping Tom").
4 427 S.E.2d 745 (Va. Ct. App. 1993).
142 Id. at 746.
'40
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the child. 143 The father had at first denied paternity and then failed to meet
support obligations.144 At trial, custody was awarded to the nonparent, who
had bonded with the 46child,'45 but the award was reversed under the
parental presumption.
And in Ferris v. Underwood,'47 there was evidence that the mother's
sister was a prostitute who sometimes visited the home, but the court
' 48
found no evidence "that that situation in any way affected the child.'
The court of appeals upheld the reversal of a juvenile court's award of
custody to the grandmother, saying custody should be with the mother
because there was insufficient 49evidence as to any adverse effect of the
parent's behavior on the child.
If a competent, stable, and loving lesbian mother is divested of custody
of her natural two-year-old child in favor of a third party in a jurisdiction
where parents have retained custody in cases as extreme as these, the
conclusion is inescapable that homophobia, pure and simple, motivated the
decision. It is wholly irrational to suggest that a court should decline to
engage in "surmise and conjecture"' ° about the harmful effects on
children of homicidal, sexually abusive, or otherwise violently dysfunctional homes, but that it may nevertheless indulge in such speculation,
even in the face of overwhelming social science evidence to the contrary,
in order to compel the removal of children from the loving homes of gay
or lesbian parents.
Faced with this conflict between the per se pronouncement of Roe and
the more general contours of domestic relations law, the trial court in
Bottoms had a choice: to read Roe literally, i.e., to hold that in all custody
disputes, regardless of the identity of the parties or their relationship to the
child, a parent's same-sex relationship creates an irrebuttable presumption
of unfitness, or to read it more loosely and hold that for one of several
reasons the Roe rule did not govern.
The trial court could have said that Roe was limited to its facts; that
Roe went beyond a decision as to which of two natural parents was
preferable and declared one of them to be unfit, a "ruling" wholly
141

Id. at 748.

'44 Id.
145 Id.

at 746.

147

Id. at 749.
385 S.E.2d 18 (Va. Ct. App. 1986).

148

Id. at 20.

146

Id. at 20-21; see also James v. James, 334 S.E.2d 551, 553 (Va. 1985) (reversing
order transferring custody to grandparents based on the divorced parents' "open hostility
... toward each other" because the parental presumption was not rebutted by clear and
convincing evidence of adverse effects).
141

150

Mason, 385 S.E.2d at 246.
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unnecessary to the result and therefore to be considered pure dicta; or that
because Roe was decided within the parent-parent context, the court in that
case did not need to decide, and did not even consider, the impact of an
anti-gay parenting rule on a class of disputes governed by a strong
countervailing presumption in favor of the natural parent. Finally, it could
have taken account of the copious social science evidence of record,
adduced principally through the expert testimony of Dr. Charlotte
Patterson,1 51 and decided-as it was urged to do-that the presumption of a
gay custodian's unsuitability could no longer be justified in light of postRoe research findings on actual outcomes in children of gay and lesbian
households.
Though the trial court phrased its ruling nominally to take account of
countervailing presumptions and to treat Roe as overcoming them-or as
152 substituting for whatever evidence might be needed to overcome them
the decision appears to have ignored the evidence of no harm to the
child,153 and subverted the legal standard requiring such a showing before
a third party may wrest custody from a parent. The lower court's ruling
cannot be construed to have followed parental presumption precedent
unless one first agrees that evidence of a natural parent's homosexual
relationship invariably overcomes the presumption. That, as the present
discussion suggests, would be begging the entire question.
The Virginia Court of Appeals, like the trial court, could readily take
any of the alternative approaches just suggested without "overruling"
Roe, as of course it lacks the formal power to do.154 'Each of these
151

See Joint Appendix at 112-35, Bottoms v. Bottoms, No. 1930-93 (Va. Ct. App. filed

Sept. 28, 1993); Trial Transcript at 110-33, Bottoms v. Bottoms (No. CH93JA0517-00).
152 I... recognize that there is a presumption in the law in favor of the custody
being with the natural parent. And I then ask myself are Sharon Bottoms'
circumstances of unfitness . . . of such an extraordinary nature as to rebut this
presumption? My answer to this is yes. In Roe v. Roe, gentlemen, page 728-it's
the only quote I am going to read to you-it says, "We have no hesitancy in saying
that the conditions under which this child must live daily are not only unlawful but
they also impose an intolerable burden upon her .... "
Joint Appendix at 198-99; Trial Transcript at 196-97 (trial court's oral ruling).
'53 See Joint Appendix at 196-99; Trial Transcript at 194-97 (trial court's oral ruling).
One should not make too much of the formal incapacity of Virginia's intermediate
'5
appellate court to pronounce Roe dead. Roe was decided before the Virginia Court
of Appeals came into existence, and the intermediate court was charged by statute to hear
appeals of right that had never before been available in cases such as this one. See VA.
CODE ANN. § 17-116.05(3)(c) (Michie Supp. 1993). Neither the appeals court nor the
Virginia Supreme Court has had to interpret or apply Roe until now, and neither court can
ignore the post-Roe changes in the relevant social science record. See supra notes 107-12
and accompanying text. Furthermore, because the intermediate appellate forum may well
be that of last resort, a decision there should not and need not shrink from a candid
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approaches would result in a reversal and a permanent retransfer of
custody to Sharon Bottoms, the natural mother. No remand for further
factfinding, or even a determination as to visitation, would be necessary
or proper, because the factual record below is quite complete as to the
superiority of the natural mother's claim under the parental presumption,
as well as the rivals' poor relationship and comparable ability to provide
separately for the child. 55
If the Court of Appeals, charged as it is with the rational development
of Virginia domestic relations law through the appeals it must hear in such
cases, issues a ruling favorable to Sharon, her mother could appeal to the
Supreme Court of Virginia-but only for discretionary review. 156 That court
could avoid confronting Roe by denying review, or it could take the case,
and preferably treat it as a chance to replace the unfitness presumption of
Roe with a "nexus" approach for all custody disputes, consistent with
current social science research. Even an opinion which clarified that a
parent's sexual orientation may only be considered as one factor in
custody determinations, but is not dispositive absent clear and convincing
evidence of harm to the child, would be a notable improvement over the
muddled state of the law for which Roe is responsible.
There is, of course, the further possibility of an application by the
losing party in Bottoms to the United States Supreme Court for certiorari.
The calendar suggests that such a petition would likely be filed no earlier
than 1995, with a decision, assuming grant of the writ, unlikely before the
end of that year or the following year. The factual posture of the case
might be different by then, depending on outcomes in the state courts and
on the lives of the litigants. The child, Tyler Doustou, will be five years
old in July 1996, and his interim custody will be significant to any
adjudication of his best interests. Indeed, changing circumstances may
assessment of Roe's continued vitality. Cf. Ford v. Ford, 419 S.E.2d 415 (Va. Ct. App.
1992); Sutherland v. Sutherland, 414 S.E.2d 617, 618 (Va. Ct. App. 1992) (relaxing the
apparently per se rule of Brown v. Brown, 237 S.E.2d 89 (Va. 1977), against grant of
custody to an adulterous parent); Smith v. Kauffman, 183 S.E.2d 190 (Va. 1971); Surratt
v. Thompson, 183 S.E.2d 200, 201-02 (Va. 1971) (abrogating long-standing common-law
interfamily and interspousal tort immunities in automobile accident cases because modem
realities of liability insurance rendered the rule anachronistic).
'5 Joint Appendix at 78-79; Trial Transcript at 76-77 (Kay Bottoms claimed $500 at
most in cash savings, with no bank account); Joint Appendix at 156; Trial Transcript at
154 (direct examination of psychiatrist Rochelle Klinger, M.D.) (Sharon Bottoms and
April Wade had "well-functioning relationship" and lived in pleasant "homey"
apartment); Joint Appendix at 25-26, 44; Trial Transcript at 23-24, 42 (relationship
between Kay and Sharon was satisfactory until Sharon confronted Kay with her
boyfriend's long-running sexual abuse of Sharon).
156 See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-670, -673(B), -675.1 (Michie 1988); VA. SUP. CT. R.
5:14, :20 (1993).

19941

CUSTODY RIGHTS

325

obviate or moot the litigation before the legal questions it raises are
resolved. While under the circumstances it is of dubious value to forecast
a Supreme Court phase for this case, the nation's highest tribunal is the
logical forum for the assertion of the relevant constitutional claims. In any
event, the next few years will witness a ripening of the constitutional
arguments against presuming that gays or lesbians are unsuitable
custodians of children.
V. CONCLUSION

A period of intense legal debate and factual inquiry has greatly
changed the landscape for a Roe-type presumption in the few short years
since that decision was rendered. Today, a court deciding the validity of
such a presumption has a choice of convincing refutations based on social
science fact or the domestic relations decisions of many states, or directly
from constitutional law. Conversely, a court inclined to retain a rule
against lesbian or gay parenting must recognize that it no longer imposes
such a rule on any authority but its own predilections.
In Virginia, even if the intermediate appellate court renders a favorable
decision in Bottoms v. Bottoms, it is premature to suggest that the day of
Roe v. Roe is past. Yet the way has now been marked for future litigants,
even in states where gay and lesbian parenting is disfavored strongly or
per se, to contend successfully against such presumptions. It is only a
matter of time before the barriers of prejudice and ill will in this critically
important area of American law, like the barriers that have stood in the
way of legal equality of the races and the sexes, begin to break down,
permitting fuller freedom and dignity for the victims of the injustice. As
Sharon Bottoms and her chosen family have reminded us, if the people
lead, the leaders will follow.

